---
title: "Trust | Veldarium"
canonical: https://www.veldarium.com/trust
html: https://www.veldarium.com/trust
description: What is working, what is synthetic, who owns each control, what evidence supports it, and where the system stops.
last_updated: 2026-09-08
representation: registry-derived Markdown
---

# Trust

> What is working, what is synthetic, who owns each control, what evidence supports it, and where the system stops.

## Capability evidence registry

Repository evidence is not production assurance.

### Governed answer contract — working-now

- **Repository evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/services/answer.ts
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/test/answer-governance.unit.test.ts
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Authenticated core and synthetic public proof
- **Owner:** Product engineering
- **Limitation:** The current synthesis path is deterministic. No external language model is invoked.
- **Next proof:** Run the contract over a permissioned real-world evidence slice and review every unsupported or conflicting answer.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### Tenant- and workspace-scoped retrieval — working-now

- **Repository evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/services/permissions.ts
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/test/mcp-permission.unit.test.ts
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Repository-backed application queries
- **Owner:** Platform engineering
- **Limitation:** Upstream source-system ACL fidelity must still be verified connector by connector.
- **Next proof:** Validate inherited ACL behavior against one bounded source connector and adversarial cross-tenant cases.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### Conflict and non-controlling evidence disclosure — working-now

- **Repository evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/services/answer-governance.ts
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/test/answer-governance.unit.test.ts
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Governed answers
- **Owner:** Product engineering
- **Limitation:** Disclosure depends on the records admitted into the permitted evidence set.
- **Next proof:** Score conflict detection and disclosure on a blinded set of contradictory operational records.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### Named human review boundary — working-now

- **Repository evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/services/actions.ts
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/test/actions-integrity.unit.test.ts
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Governed action proposals
- **Owner:** Product engineering
- **Limitation:** Only repository-supported actions are executable. Unsupported external writes remain blocked.
- **Next proof:** Exercise maker-checker approval, rejection, expiry, and replay behavior in a monitored pilot workflow.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### Deterministic work-package readiness verdict — synthetic-demo

- **Repository evidence:** apps/web/src/lib/shipbuilding/readiness.ts
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** apps/web/src/lib/shipbuilding/__tests__/readiness.test.ts
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Synthetic VS-001 proof (WP-019)
- **Owner:** Product engineering
- **Limitation:** Computes Ready / Not ready / Cannot establish from six gates on synthetic data. No live model, no shipyard connector; a named human releases the work.
- **Next proof:** Compare live bounded work-package verdicts with authorized releases and audit false-ready, false-blocked, and unknown cases.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### Synthetic Build Graph and vessel-state model — synthetic-demo

- **Repository evidence:** apps/web/src/lib/shipbuilding/build-graph.ts; apps/web/src/lib/shipbuilding/work-packages.ts
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** apps/web/src/lib/shipbuilding/__tests__/build-graph-traversal.test.ts
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Synthetic vessel VS-001 and work package WP-019
- **Owner:** Product and design
- **Limitation:** The graph, vessel, records, and outcomes are hand-authored. It is not naval architecture, a customer record, or a production deployment.
- **Next proof:** Map a bounded real program slice and measure identity, relationship, provenance, and authority completeness.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### Actor-attributed audit events — under-development

- **Repository evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/services/audit.ts; packages/prisma/prisma/schema.prisma
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** packages/core/src_pkg/test/actions-integrity.unit.test.ts
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Selected authenticated workflows
- **Owner:** Platform engineering
- **Limitation:** Retention, export, backup, and recovery evidence remain deployment-specific.
- **Next proof:** Demonstrate immutable actor attribution, export, retention, backup, and recovery in a deployment environment.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### Enterprise identity and lifecycle — under-development

- **Repository evidence:** apps/web/src/app/api/auth/oidc/status/route.ts; packages/core/src_pkg/services/oidc.ts
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** None claimed
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Hosted access
- **Owner:** Platform engineering
- **Limitation:** Password sessions exist. OIDC exchange, provisioning, MFA policy, and directory lifecycle are not complete.
- **Next proof:** Complete and test an enterprise identity lifecycle with MFA policy, revocation, and provisioning evidence.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### Bounded document ingestion — under-development

- **Repository evidence:** apps/web/src/app/api/ingest/_lib/upload-policy.ts; packages/core/src_pkg/services/parsers.ts
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** apps/web/src/app/api/ingest/_lib/__tests__/upload-policy.test.ts
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Uploaded CSV, PDF, DOCX, and XLSX records
- **Owner:** Platform engineering
- **Limitation:** Files are treated as untrusted. No malware-scanning service is currently claimed.
- **Next proof:** Add and validate malware scanning, quarantine, parser isolation, and failure telemetry in a monitored environment.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### Live enterprise connectors — planned

- **Repository evidence:** docs/PRODUCT_TRUTH.md
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** None claimed
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Customer environments
- **Owner:** Product engineering
- **Limitation:** No production connector fleet or inherited-ACL claim is made.
- **Next proof:** Build one bounded connector and verify identity, authority, freshness, provenance, failure, and inherited permissions.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

### External security assurance — not-claimed

- **Repository evidence:** docs/PUBLIC_CLAIMS_REGISTER.md
- **Test / evaluation evidence:** None claimed
- **Production evidence:** None claimed
- **Scope:** Company
- **Owner:** Company
- **Limitation:** No SOC 2, ISO 27001, HIPAA, FedRAMP, or formal penetration-test claim is made.
- **Next proof:** Define the assurance scope, operate the controls, and obtain independent evidence before making any certification claim.
- **Last verified:** 2026-09-07

## Contact

Bring one bounded build problem: [chris@veldarium.com](mailto:chris@veldarium.com). Do not send confidential information in the first message.